Product Strategy
beta · Family strategy-docs · Phase undefined · Sizes lean, full · Formats kernel, one-pager · ~2,700 tokens
The document that says which problems this product will solve to reach its vision, and which it will not. It is judged by whether a competitor’s name could be swapped in without the document becoming false: a strategy nobody could disagree with has not chosen anything.
How to pick a format and a size, how to tell whether the draft is any good, and when to stop.
Before you start: is this the right document at all?
Section titled “Before you start: is this the right document at all?”Write a product strategy when a team has to choose between reasonable options and the choice keeps reopening. Do not write one to satisfy a template, a planning cycle, or a request for “the strategy deck”.
Write something else if:
| You actually need | Because |
|---|---|
| a product vision | you are arguing about the destination, not the route. Vision describes the future state; strategy is the set of choices to reach it |
| a product roadmap | the choices are settled and the argument is about order and timing |
| OKRs | the strategy exists and you need this period’s measurable objectives. OKRs measure execution; they do not choose |
| a PRD | one specific thing is agreed and needs specifying |
| a business case | the question is whether to fund it at all |
Write nothing at all if the team already agrees, the agreement is holding, and nobody has asked it to justify a refusal. A document produced to have a document is the cheapest way to make a real strategy harder to write later, because the next one has to argue with this one first.
A warning worth taking seriously. No study measures whether writing this document improves product
outcomes. What is measured is adjacent and mixed, and one study found managers believed planning was helping
when the financial data did not agree. If you cannot say what argument this document is going to settle,
writing it will feel productive and prove nothing. See product-strategy_companion.md section 1.
Picking a format and a size
Section titled “Picking a format and a size”Format is the opening question, and it is a real choice:
- kernel (
product-strategy_template-lean.md,product-strategy_template-full.md) starts from the obstacle. Use it when the team does not agree on what is hard. This is the default. - one-pager (
product-strategy_template-one-pager-full.md) starts from the choice. Use it when the problem is understood and the argument is about where to compete.
If you cannot fill in “Where We Will Play” because people are still arguing about what is wrong, you wanted the kernel.
Size is how much context the reader lacks:
- lean for a team that shares the context and needs to settle what to work on.
- full for readers who were not in the argument: a new leader, another function, a board, or your own team in six months.
A named variant worth stealing from, in either format. Ramp’s published template adds two questions
this bundle does not ship as sections: right to win and risks. See
product-strategy_companion.md section 9.
The one test that outranks the rest
Section titled “The one test that outranks the rest”Swap in a competitor’s name. If the document still reads true, you have described an industry rather than made a choice.
Everything else in this guide is a way of finding out why it failed that test.
The second test is shorter and harsher: if nothing in the document made anyone uncomfortable, it is a wish list. A strategy that costs nothing to agree with has not chosen anything.
The rubric
Section titled “The rubric”Score each 0, 1 or 2. Under 13 out of 20 and this will not survive its first real disagreement. It will be nodded at, filed, and quietly ignored while the roadmap decides what actually happens.
| # | Criterion | 0 | 1 | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Diagnosed | No obstacle named | An obstacle among several challenges listed | One obstacle named, and you can point at the evidence that it is the binding one |
| 2 | Falsifiable diagnosis | Could not be wrong | Arguably wrong, but nobody has argued | Someone on the team disagreed with it, and the disagreement is recorded or resolved |
| 3 | Constraining policy | Restates the goal | An approach, but nothing is ruled out by it | You can name a reasonable option the policy forbids, and someone wanted that option |
| 4 | Coherent action | A list of unrelated work | Actions that each serve the policy | You can say which two actions make each other stronger, and what breaks if one is dropped |
| 5 | Refusals with a cost | Nothing declined | Declines things nobody asked for | Declines something a named person wanted, and they have been told |
| 6 | Not a roadmap | Delivery dates and feature names throughout | Some named deliverables leak in | No delivery commitment could be lifted from this document; sequence lives in the roadmap. A measurement deadline in row 8 and a review backstop in row 10 are not roadmap dates and do not count against this row |
| 7 | Not interchangeable | A competitor’s name fits unchanged | Mostly generic, one specific claim | You can point at the sentence a competitor could not write, and say what they would have to give up to write it |
| 8 | Falsifiable outcome (kernel-full, one-pager) | No measure | A measure with no baseline or date | A leading indicator with a baseline, a date, and a stated result that would make you abandon the strategy |
| 9 | Assumptions exposed (kernel-full only) | None stated | Risks listed generically | The assumption the strategy would die without is named, with the evidence you have and the evidence you lack |
| 10 | Owned and triggered (kernel-full only) | No review, no owner | “Reviewed quarterly” | An event that triggers review, a backstop date, and a named person |
Which rows apply to what. The rubric is written for the kernel, which is the default format. Scope, in full:
| Document | Rows that apply | Maximum | Score against |
|---|---|---|---|
| kernel, full | all 10 | 20 | 13 |
| kernel, lean | 1-7 (it has no measure, assumptions or trigger section) | 14 | 9 |
| one-pager | 3-8 (it starts from the choice, so rows 1-2 have no diagnosis to grade, and it carries no assumptions or review-trigger section) | 12 | 8 |
Every threshold is the same proportion of the available points. Rows 1 and 2 do not apply to the one-pager on purpose, not by oversight: that format deliberately opens from the choice rather than the obstacle, which is exactly why the guide tells you to use the kernel instead when the team is still arguing about what is wrong. Row 8 does apply to it, because the one-pager carries its own “How We Will Know We Have Won” section.
Format-specific checks
Section titled “Format-specific checks”Kernel. Read the diagnosis and the guiding policy alone, in that order. Does the policy obviously answer the diagnosis? If a reader could not tell which obstacle the policy is for, the two sections were written independently, which is the failure this format is most prone to.
One-pager. Read “Where We Will Play” and “How We Will Win” alone. Does the second explain why you win in the first, against alternatives that exist there? A “how we will win” that would be true anywhere means the cascade broke at the second step.
Failure signals to look for in the draft
Section titled “Failure signals to look for in the draft”- The goal has replaced the diagnosis. “We need to grow self-serve revenue” is a target. The diagnosis is why that has not already happened.
- Fluff. Elevated language that survives any edit because it asserts nothing.
- Rah-rah. “World-class”, “delightful”, “best-in-class”. Nobody could disagree, so nothing was chosen.
- The roadmap in disguise. Dated features under strategy headings; the hard question was skipped.
- The OKR substitute. Objectives and numbers, with no reasoning for why those objectives.
- Straddling. Two incompatible positions held at once. Porter’s worked case is Continental Lite, which “lost hundreds of millions of dollars, and the CEO lost his job”.
- Everything survives. Every option that was on the table before the document still is.
- Nobody is uncomfortable. The clearest signal of all.
When it is good enough
Section titled “When it is good enough”When someone can use it to refuse a plausible, senior, well-argued request, and when the person whose work it declines has read it and knows why. A strategy that has never been cited in a decision is not finished, however well it reads.
Then delete every HTML comment, and put the review trigger in a calendar with a name attached.
The artifacts
Section titled “The artifacts”product-strategy_template-lean.md · ~2,700 tokens
---title: "{{product_name}} Product Strategy"product: "{{product_name}}"owner: "{{who_owns_this_strategy}}"period: "{{period_this_covers}}"status: "{{draft_or_agreed}}"last_updated: "{{date}}"doc_type: product-strategysize: leanformat: kernelsource_template: product-strategysource_template_version: 0.1.0---
<!--LEAN PRODUCT STRATEGY (kernel format). The smallest strategy that can still do a strategy's job: theobstacle you have diagnosed, the approach you are taking to it, the action that follows, and what that rulesout. Four sections, one page. To grow it into a strategy that has to survive people who were not in the room(see product-strategy_template-full.md), ADD sections; never rename or reorder the ones below, because thefull variant is a strict superset of this one.
THE TEST THIS DOCUMENT HAS TO PASS. Swap in a competitor's name. If it still reads true, you have describedan industry rather than made a choice. The second test is shorter: if nothing in it made anyoneuncomfortable, it is a wish list. Both come from practitioners, not from theory, and they are the reason"What We Are Not Doing" is in the LEAN variant and not an optional extra.
WHAT THE EVIDENCE ACTUALLY SAYS, SO YOU ARE NOT MISLED. No study measures whether writing a product strategydocument improves product outcomes. There is a mixed literature on whether strategic PLANNING as a processcorrelates with firm performance, and one study of listed firms found no correlation with objectivefinancial results while finding one with what managers BELIEVED. So "everyone felt it helped" is notevidence. This template earns its place by making choices explicit, not by a proven effect. Seeproduct-strategy_companion.md section 1.
THE KERNEL IS NOT THIS LIBRARY'S INVENTION. Diagnosis, guiding policy and coherent action come from RichardRumelt's Good Strategy Bad Strategy (2011). The headings are his; the guidance below is this bundle's.
THIS IS ONE OF TWO FORMATS, AND THE CHOICE IS REAL.- This kernel starts from the obstacle. Reach for it when the hard part is that nobody agrees what the problem is.- product-strategy_template-one-pager-full.md is a choice cascade (winning aspiration, where we will play, how we will win). Reach for it when the problem is understood and the hard part is choosing between places to compete.They are different opening questions, not two sizes of one document. See product-strategy_companion.mdsection 4.
WHAT A PRODUCT STRATEGY IS, AND IS NOTIt is the set of choices that gets you from where you are to the vision. It is NOT a vision (that is thedestination), NOT a roadmap (that is sequence and timing), NOT OKRs (those measure a period's execution),and NOT a business strategy (that decides where the company invests). The strategy/roadmap boundary is the one thisbundle's sources return to most often: the moment dates and feature names appear, you are writing the next documentdown. See product-strategy_companion.md section 8.
HOW TO FILL THIS IN1. Read the comment under each heading: WHAT it wants, WHY it matters (with a pointer into product-strategy_companion.md), guiding questions to ASK, a GOOD and a WEAK example, and the TRAP to avoid.2. Replace each {{placeholder}} with your content.3. Write the diagnosis first and do not move on until it names ONE obstacle. Every other section depends on it, and a strategy with a vague diagnosis fails quietly rather than loudly.4. If a section does not apply, write "N/A" and one line of why, rather than deleting it.5. Before you share it: self-grade against product-strategy_guide.md, then DELETE every HTML comment. They are guidance, not content.-->
# {{product_name}} Product Strategy
## Diagnosis
<!-- WHAT The one thing that makes the goal hard. Not a summary of the market, not a list of challenges: the single obstacle that, if it went away, would make the rest straightforward. Two or three sentences. WHY This is the section that separates a strategy from a wish. Rumelt's test is that if you fail to identify and analyse the obstacle you do not have a strategy, you have "either a stretch goal, a budget, or a list of things you wish would happen". Everything downstream is an answer to this paragraph, so a vague diagnosis produces a document that cannot be wrong and therefore cannot be useful. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Diagnosis). ASK What is actually stopping us? If this obstacle disappeared overnight, would the goal become easy? Is this a cause or a symptom? Would a competitor recognise this as their obstacle too, and if so, have we named ours? GOOD "Dispatchers build a route in under a minute, but only once someone has told them which jobs are genuinely urgent. Urgency lives in the free-text notes field: in the 200 jobs we sampled, three of every five emergencies were caught by a human reading it. Our scheduling engine is fast and it is scheduling the wrong things first." (one obstacle, evidenced, and it rules some responses out) WEAK "The market is increasingly competitive and customers expect more from field-service software. We need to keep innovating to stay ahead." (true of every company in the category; names nothing that could be wrong) TRAP Writing the goal here instead of the obstacle. "We need to grow self-serve revenue" is a target. The diagnosis is why that has not already happened. -->
{{the_diagnosis}}
## Guiding Policy
<!-- WHAT The approach you are taking to the obstacle above. One paragraph. It should constrain: a reader should be able to name a reasonable option it rules out. WHY A guiding policy is a direction, not a plan. Rumelt's image is guardrails: it directs and constrains action without fully defining it. If every option that was on the table last month still survives this paragraph, it is not a policy, it is a preamble. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Guiding Policy). ASK What does this rule out? Which team's current plan changes because of this? If someone disagreed with us, what would they be arguing for instead? Is this an approach, or a restatement of the goal? GOOD "We will infer urgency from the job record rather than asking dispatchers to encode it. Given a choice between a better form for entering priority and a model that reads what is already written, we read what is already written." (an approach with a real alternative it rejects: redesigning the intake form) WEAK "We will focus on delivering an excellent dispatcher experience and driving scheduling efficiency." (names no alternative, so it forbids nothing) TRAP Listing several policies. If you have three, you have not chosen; you have deferred the choice to whoever reads this next, and they will pick the one that suits them. -->
{{the_guiding_policy}}
## Coherent Action
<!-- WHAT The moves that carry out the policy, and how they reinforce each other. Three to five, as prose or a short list. Each should be a kind of work, not a dated deliverable. WHY The word doing the work is "coherent". Porter's argument is that fit is what makes a position durable, because it "locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest link": actions that each make sense alone but do not reinforce each other are a list, not a strategy. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Coherent Action). ASK Does each action serve the policy, or just seem generally good? Which two of these make each other stronger? If we dropped one, would the others still work? Are these kinds of work, or are they release dates wearing a disguise? GOOD "1. Extract urgency signals from the notes field at ingest, so priority exists before a human reads anything. 2. Show the inferred priority beside the dispatcher's own, so disagreement is visible rather than silent. 3. Track the override rate as our leading indicator. The first two make the inference usable; the third is how we learn whether it is any good." (each serves the policy, and they compound) WEAK "Launch AI assistant in Q3. Redesign the intake form. Hire two data scientists. Improve the mobile app." (a dated to-do list; nothing here reinforces anything else) TRAP Writing the roadmap. If a reader could build a Gantt chart directly from this section, it has stopped being strategy. Sequence and timing belong in the roadmap, which is downstream of this document. -->
{{the_coherent_action}}
## What We Are Not Doing
<!-- WHAT The things you are explicitly declining this period, and one line each on why. Two to five. Name real options, not straw ones. WHY This is the section that makes the other three usable, and the one every quality test in this bundle's research turns on. The test practitioners actually apply is whether the team can say "this is a really great idea... but we're not going to build it" and mean it. A strategy that makes nobody uncomfortable is a wish list. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (What We Are Not Doing) and section 7. ASK What has been asked for repeatedly that we are now refusing? Which of these would a competitor happily do? Who will be unhappy when they read this, and have we told them? If nothing here costs us anything, have we actually chosen? GOOD "1. We are not shipping the customer-facing arrival-window feature this year. It is the most requested item in our backlog and it depends on scheduling accuracy we do not yet have. 2. We are not taking on national facilities-management contractors. They are winnable and they buy on compliance reporting, which pulls us back toward the forms-and-fields product." (both were live options; both have a named cost) WEAK "We are not going to compromise on quality or lose focus on the customer." (nobody was proposing either; refusing nothing) TRAP Listing only things nobody wanted. A refusal that costs nothing proves nothing. If every item here is uncontroversial, the hard choice is still hiding somewhere else in the document. -->
{{what_we_are_not_doing}}product-strategy_template-full.md · ~3,400 tokens
---title: "{{product_name}} Product Strategy"product: "{{product_name}}"owner: "{{who_owns_this_strategy}}"period: "{{period_this_covers}}"status: "{{draft_or_agreed}}"last_updated: "{{date}}"doc_type: product-strategysize: fullformat: kernelsource_template: product-strategysource_template_version: 0.1.0---
<!--FULL PRODUCT STRATEGY (kernel format). Every section of product-strategy_template-lean.md, in the same order,plus the four a strategy needs when it has to survive people who were not in the room: who it is and is notfor, how you will know it is working, what it assumes, and what brings you back to it.
USE FULL WHEN the strategy will be read by someone who was not in the argument that produced it: a newleader, a board, a team in another function, or your own team in six months. Use lean(product-strategy_template-lean.md) when a small group needs to settle what to work on and everyone alreadyshares the context.
THE TEST THIS DOCUMENT HAS TO PASS. Swap in a competitor's name. If it still reads true, you have describedan industry rather than made a choice. If nothing in it made anyone uncomfortable, it is a wish list.
WHAT THE EVIDENCE ACTUALLY SAYS, SO YOU ARE NOT MISLED. No study measures whether writing a product strategydocument improves product outcomes. The literature on strategic PLANNING as a process is mixed, and onestudy of listed firms found no correlation with objective financial performance while finding one with whatmanagers believed. "Everyone felt it helped" is not evidence. See product-strategy_companion.md section 1.
THE KERNEL IS NOT THIS LIBRARY'S INVENTION. Diagnosis, guiding policy and coherent action come from RichardRumelt's Good Strategy Bad Strategy (2011).
THIS IS ONE OF TWO FORMATS. product-strategy_template-one-pager-full.md is a choice cascade for when theproblem is understood and the hard part is choosing where to compete. Seeproduct-strategy_companion.md section 4.
HOW TO FILL THIS IN1. Read the comment under each heading: WHAT it wants, WHY it matters (with a pointer into product-strategy_companion.md), guiding questions to ASK, a GOOD and a WEAK example, and the TRAP to avoid.2. Replace each {{placeholder}} with your content.3. Write the diagnosis first and do not move on until it names ONE obstacle.4. If a section does not apply, write "N/A" and one line of why, rather than deleting it.5. Before you share it: self-grade against product-strategy_guide.md, then DELETE every HTML comment.-->
# {{product_name}} Product Strategy
## Diagnosis
<!-- WHAT The one thing that makes the goal hard. Not a summary of the market, not a list of challenges: the single obstacle that, if it went away, would make the rest straightforward. WHY This is the section that separates a strategy from a wish. Rumelt's test is that without an analysed obstacle you have "either a stretch goal, a budget, or a list of things you wish would happen". Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Diagnosis). ASK What is actually stopping us? If this obstacle disappeared overnight, would the goal become easy? Is this a cause or a symptom? Would a competitor recognise this as their obstacle too? GOOD "Dispatchers build a route in under a minute, but only once someone has told them which jobs are genuinely urgent. Urgency lives in the free-text notes field: in the 200 jobs we sampled, three of every five emergencies were caught by a human reading it. Our scheduling engine is fast and it is scheduling the wrong things first." WEAK "The market is increasingly competitive and customers expect more from field-service software." (true of every company in the category; names nothing that could be wrong) TRAP Writing the goal here instead of the obstacle. "We need to grow self-serve revenue" is a target; the diagnosis is why that has not already happened. -->
{{the_diagnosis}}
## Target Segments, and Non-Targets
<!-- WHAT Who this strategy is for, specifically, and who it is explicitly NOT for this period. A short table or two short lists. WHY Naming non-targets is one of the few concrete tests practitioners publish for whether a strategy is real: a strategy that clearly identifies target AND non-target segments has made a choice a reader can check. Without it, "focus" is a word rather than a decision. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Target Segments) and section 7. ASK Who do we win with today, and is that who we are aiming at? Which segment are we declining, and who inside the company will object? If we optimised entirely for the target, which current customer would be worse off? GOOD "Target: dispatchers at 10-80 vehicle operators who schedule the same day work arrives. Non-target this period: national facilities-management contractors. They buy on compliance reporting, which pulls us back toward the forms-and-fields product we are trying to stop being." (both named, with the cost of the refusal stated) WEAK "Target: growing service businesses that value operational efficiency." (excludes nobody, so it is not a segmentation) TRAP Listing every segment you sell to. A target list that matches your customer list is a description of the past, not a choice about the future. -->
{{target_segments_and_non_targets}}
## Guiding Policy
<!-- WHAT The approach you are taking to the obstacle. One paragraph. It should constrain: a reader should be able to name a reasonable option it rules out. WHY A guiding policy is a direction, not a plan. Rumelt's image is guardrails: it directs and constrains action without fully defining it. If every option that was on the table last month survives it, it is a preamble. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Guiding Policy). ASK What does this rule out? Which team's current plan changes because of this? If someone disagreed, what would they argue for instead? GOOD "We will infer urgency from the job record rather than asking dispatchers to encode it. Given a choice between a better form for entering priority and a model that reads what is already written, we read what is already written." WEAK "We will focus on delivering an excellent dispatcher experience and driving scheduling efficiency." TRAP Listing several policies. If you have three, you have deferred the choice to whoever reads this next. -->
{{the_guiding_policy}}
## Coherent Action
<!-- WHAT The moves that carry out the policy, and how they reinforce each other. Three to five kinds of work, not dated deliverables. WHY The word doing the work is "coherent". Porter's argument is that fit is what makes a position durable: it "locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest link". Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Coherent Action). ASK Does each action serve the policy, or just seem generally good? Which two make each other stronger? Are these kinds of work, or release dates wearing a disguise? GOOD "1. Extract urgency signals from the notes field at ingest. 2. Show the inferred priority beside the dispatcher's own, so disagreement is visible. 3. Track the override rate as our leading indicator. The first two make the inference usable; the third is how we learn whether it works." WEAK "Launch AI assistant in Q3. Redesign the intake form. Hire two data scientists." (a dated to-do list; nothing reinforces anything else) TRAP Writing the roadmap. If a reader could build a Gantt chart from this section, it has stopped being strategy. -->
{{the_coherent_action}}
## What We Are Not Doing
<!-- WHAT The things you are explicitly declining this period, and one line each on why. Two to five. Name real options. WHY This is the section that makes the others usable, and the one every quality test in this bundle's research turns on. The test practitioners apply is whether the team can say "this is a really great idea... but we're not going to build it" and mean it. A strategy that makes nobody uncomfortable is a wish list. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (What We Are Not Doing) and section 7. ASK What has been asked for repeatedly that we are now refusing? Who will be unhappy when they read this, and have we told them? If nothing here costs us anything, have we chosen? GOOD "We are not shipping the customer-facing arrival-window feature this year. It is the most requested item in our backlog and it depends on scheduling accuracy we do not yet have." WEAK "We are not going to compromise on quality or lose focus on the customer." TRAP Listing only things nobody wanted. A refusal that costs nothing proves nothing. -->
{{what_we_are_not_doing}}
## How We Will Know It Is Working
<!-- WHAT The change you expect to see, the measure that would show it, and roughly when. Two or three lines. One leading indicator matters more than five lagging ones. WHY This is where the strategy becomes falsifiable. It is NOT your OKRs: OKRs measure a period's execution, while the strategy decides which objectives were worth setting in the first place, and practitioners warn specifically against letting the former replace the latter. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (How We Will Know) and section 8. ASK What number moves first if this is working? What would we see in eight weeks, not eight months? What result would make us abandon this strategy rather than try harder at it? GOOD "Leading: dispatcher override rate on inferred priority, from 48 percent to under 20 percent by the end of Q2. Lagging: emergency jobs completed within the promised window. If the override rate has not moved by the end of Q2 we treat the diagnosis as wrong, not the execution." (one leading, one lagging, and a stated falsifier) WEAK "Increase engagement and drive revenue growth." (no baseline, no date, nothing that could come back negative) TRAP Pasting in this quarter's OKRs. If this section could be lifted into a planning tool unchanged, you have written objectives, not a way to tell whether the strategy is right. -->
{{how_we_will_know}}
## Assumptions and Risks
<!-- WHAT What has to be true for this to work, and what would falsify it. Three to five, each with the evidence you have and the evidence you lack. WHY In uncertainty the useful discipline is writing down assumptions to be tested rather than projections to be met. Ramp's published strategy template makes risk an explicit section, asking "why would we fail and what should we do about it". Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Assumptions and Risks) and section 6. ASK What are we assuming about users that we have not checked? Which assumption, if wrong, breaks the whole strategy rather than one action? What is the cheapest test of that one? GOOD "We assume urgency is recoverable from the notes field. Evidence: three of five sampled emergencies had it there in plain language. Counter-evidence: we never looked at the two that did not, and they may be the expensive ones. Test: read the 40 most costly late jobs by 15 March." (falsifiable, with the gap in the evidence stated) WEAK "Risk: competitors may launch similar features." (generic, not tied to this strategy, and no test) TRAP Listing risks you cannot act on. A risk register is a different document; here, keep the assumptions this strategy would die without. -->
{{assumptions_and_risks}}
## Review Trigger
<!-- WHAT What brings the team back to this document. An event, plus a backstop date. WHY Strategies do not usually fail loudly; they go stale quietly. Named practitioners recommend reviewing at least every three months even for a strategy nominally spanning a year, and one team ties its cadence to a measurement rather than a calendar. Distinguish scheduled REVIEW from reactive rewriting: quarterly review is healthy, quarterly pivots triggered by a competitor's announcement are a symptom. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Review Trigger). ASK What would have to happen for this to be wrong? Who is responsible for noticing? What is the date we look again even if nothing happens? GOOD "Reviewed when the override rate moves 10 points in either direction, when a target-segment renewal is lost on scheduling accuracy, or on 31 August, whichever comes first. Owner: the head of product." (an event, a backstop, and a name) WEAK "Reviewed quarterly." (a calendar entry with nobody attached and no trigger) TRAP Making the trigger a competitor's launch. That is how a strategy becomes a series of reactions. Trigger on your own evidence. -->
{{review_trigger}}product-strategy_template-one-pager-full.md · ~3,050 tokens
---title: "{{product_name}} Product Strategy"product: "{{product_name}}"owner: "{{who_owns_this_strategy}}"period: "{{period_this_covers}}"status: "{{draft_or_agreed}}"last_updated: "{{date}}"doc_type: product-strategysize: fullformat: one-pagersource_template: product-strategysource_template_version: 0.1.0---
<!--PRODUCT STRATEGY, ONE-PAGER FORMAT (choice cascade). A different opening question from the kernel format,not a different size of it.
WHEN TO REACH FOR THIS INSTEAD OF THE KERNEL. The kernel (product-strategy_template-lean.md andproduct-strategy_template-full.md) starts from the obstacle: use it when the hard part is that nobody agreeswhat the problem is. This cascade starts from the choice: use it when the problem is understood and the hardpart is deciding where to compete and how to win there. If you find yourself unable to fill in "Where WeWill Play" because you are still arguing about what is wrong, you want the kernel.
WHERE THIS SHAPE COMES FROM, AND WHAT THIS BUNDLE ADDED. It is a Playing-to-Win-derived cascade as publishedby a named practitioner: winning aspiration, how we will know we have won, where we will play, how we willwin, capabilities, and product principles. This bundle ships it because it is structurally distinct from thekernel and genuinely in circulation, which is the bar this library sets before adding a format. ONE SECTIONIS THIS BUNDLE'S ADDITION and is not in the published cascade: "What We Are Not Doing". It is added becauseevery quality test the research found turns on naming refusals, and a cascade can otherwise state where itwill play without ever saying what it declines. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 4.
A NAMED REAL-WORLD VARIANT is described in product-strategy_companion.md section 9 rather than shipped as athird file, because it is one company's document rather than a named reusable format. Its "right to win" and"risks" questions are worth stealing whichever format you use.
THE TEST THIS DOCUMENT HAS TO PASS is the same for every format. Swap in a competitor's name; if it stillreads true, you have described an industry rather than made a choice.
ON LENGTH. One page is a position, not a finding. Amazon standardises on six narrative pages for majordecisions; other named practitioners argue one page forces focus. No study of document length was found.Pick deliberately and say why. See product-strategy_companion.md section 4.
HOW TO FILL THIS IN1. Read the comment under each heading: WHAT, WHY (with a companion pointer), ASK, GOOD, WEAK, TRAP.2. Replace each {{placeholder}} with your content.3. Fill "What We Are Not Doing" before you consider the draft finished. It is the section that makes the rest usable.4. If a section does not apply, write "N/A" and one line of why.5. Before you share it: self-grade against product-strategy_guide.md, then DELETE every HTML comment.-->
# {{product_name}} Product Strategy
## Winning Aspiration
<!-- WHAT What winning means for this product, in one or two sentences. Not the company mission, and not a revenue target on its own. WHY The cascade only works if the aspiration is specific enough to make the later choices consequential. An aspiration that any competitor would also claim produces a cascade of choices that any competitor would also make. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Winning Aspiration). ASK What does winning look like for the user, not just for us? Would our closest competitor write this same sentence? What are we willing to be worse at in order to win this way? GOOD "Dispatchers at small fleets send the right van to the right job without reading a single note, and they trust the order the system proposes enough to stop rebuilding it by hand." (a specific state of the world, and it implies trade-offs) WEAK "Be the market leader in field service." (a position, not an aspiration, and no user in it) TRAP Writing the vision here. If your product has a vision document, this section is the part of it this strategy period is actually chasing, not the whole thing. -->
{{winning_aspiration}}
## How We Will Know We Have Won
<!-- WHAT The evidence that the aspiration is being reached: one leading measure, one lagging, and roughly when you expect to see each. WHY The published cascade puts this second, immediately after the aspiration and before any choice is made, and the ordering is the point: an aspiration you cannot tell you are reaching will be reinterpreted at the end of the period to match whatever happened. It is NOT your OKRs, which measure a period's execution rather than deciding which objectives were worth setting. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (How We Will Know We Have Won) and section 8. ASK What moves first if this is working? What would we see in eight weeks rather than eight months? What result would make us abandon this strategy rather than try harder at it? GOOD "Leading: dispatcher override rate on inferred priority, from 48 percent to under 20 percent by the end of Q2. Lagging: emergency jobs completed inside the promised window. If the override rate has not moved by the end of Q2, the aspiration was wrong rather than under-resourced." (one leading, one lagging, and a stated falsifier) WEAK "Increased adoption and improved customer satisfaction." (no baseline, no date, nothing that could come back negative) TRAP Pasting in this quarter's OKRs. If this section could be lifted into a planning tool unchanged, you have written objectives rather than a way to tell whether the strategy is right. -->
{{how_we_will_know_we_have_won}}
## Where We Will Play
<!-- WHAT The segments, use cases, channels and geographies you are competing in this period. Name what is in AND what is out. WHY This is the choice that makes the strategy checkable. "Where to play" without a corresponding "where not to play" is a description of your current customer list. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Where We Will Play) and section 7. ASK Which segment do we decline? Which use case do we leave to someone else? If we are strong somewhere we are not choosing to play, why are we keeping it? GOOD "In: 10-80 vehicle operators in plumbing, HVAC and electrical, direct sales, UK and Ireland. Out: national facilities-management contractors, and the white-label channel we won two deals in last year." (explicit exclusions, including a profitable one) WEAK "Mid-market and enterprise across all major verticals." (nothing excluded) TRAP Choosing a market you have never sold into because it is large. Where you play should be where your right to win is real, not where the total addressable market is biggest. -->
{{where_we_will_play}}
## How We Will Win
<!-- WHAT Why you win where you have chosen to play, against the specific alternatives available there. Name the alternatives. WHY Porter's argument is that a position is durable when it rests on activities configured differently from rivals, not on doing the same activities better: "the essence of strategy is choosing to perform activities differently than rivals do". A "how we win" that is really "we will execute well" describes effort, not position. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 2 and section 3 (How We Will Win). ASK Against whom, exactly? What would a competitor have to give up to copy this? Is this a difference in what we do, or only in how hard we try? GOOD "We win by reading urgency out of the work that already exists rather than asking anyone to classify it. Competitors invest in richer intake forms and compliance reporting; we invest in inference and in showing our working. Copying us means giving up the structured-data story their enterprise contracts are sold on." (names the alternative and the cost of imitation) WEAK "Superior user experience, faster performance, and better customer support." (three things every competitor claims) TRAP Listing your feature advantages. Features get copied in a quarter. The question is what configuration of choices makes copying expensive. -->
{{how_we_will_win}}
## Capabilities and Systems
<!-- WHAT What the team must be able to do, and what has to exist, for the above to be true. Three to five. WHY This is where a cascade stops being aspirational: it names the gap between the strategy and the organisation you actually have. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Capabilities and Systems). ASK Which of these do we not have today? What are we going to stop doing to build them? Which one, if we never build it, makes the strategy fail? GOOD "1. Urgency inference we can run at ingest, prototyped once and never in production. 2. A labelled corpus of past jobs, which only the support team can produce. 3. Instrumentation good enough to see an override the moment it happens. We have none of the three, and building 2 means support stops taking tier-1 tickets for a quarter." (honest about the gap and its cost) WEAK "Strong engineering, good design, and a data-driven culture." (generic, unmeasurable, and true of the company you already are) TRAP Listing capabilities you already have. This section earns its place by naming what is missing. -->
{{capabilities_and_systems}}
## Product Principles
<!-- WHAT Two to five rules that resolve recurring trade-offs the same way every time, so the team does not relitigate them. WHY Principles are the strategy's delegation mechanism: they let people decide without asking. A principle that never rules anything out is decoration. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (Product Principles). ASK What argument keeps recurring? What does this principle cost us when it bites? Would anyone ever argue for the opposite, and if not, is it a principle? GOOD "Propose, never impose: when we infer something, we show it beside what the user entered and let them overrule it in one action. Cost: more screen space and a slower path for the cases we get right." (a rule with a stated cost) WEAK "Be customer-obsessed." (nobody argues for the opposite) TRAP Writing values. Values describe how you want to behave; principles decide arguments. If it does not resolve a real disagreement, it belongs somewhere else. -->
{{product_principles}}
## What We Are Not Doing
<!-- WHAT The things you are explicitly declining this period, and one line each on why. Two to five. WHY The section that makes the rest usable, and the one every quality test in this bundle's research turns on. The practical test is whether the team can say "this is a really great idea... but we're not going to build it" and mean it; the sharper one is whether anyone was made uncomfortable. Deep dive: product-strategy_companion.md section 3 (What We Are Not Doing) and section 7. ASK What has been asked for repeatedly that we are now refusing? Who will be unhappy, and have we told them? If nothing here costs us anything, have we chosen? GOOD "We are not shipping the customer-facing arrival-window feature this year. It is the most requested item in our backlog and it depends on scheduling accuracy we do not yet have. Sales has been told." WEAK "We are not going to lose focus." (refuses nothing) TRAP Listing only things nobody wanted. A refusal that costs nothing proves nothing. -->
{{what_we_are_not_doing}}---title: "Acme Analytics Product Strategy FY26"product: "Acme Analytics"owner: "Dana Okoro, VP Product"period: "FY26 (February 2026 to January 2027)"status: "agreed"last_updated: "2026-01-28"doc_type: product-strategysize: fullformat: kernelsource_template: product-strategysource_template_version: 0.1.0---
> **Worked example.** A filled `product-strategy`, full variant, kernel format, for the same Acme Analytics> product used by the `product-vision`, `prd`, `test-plan`, `test-case` and `bug-report` examples. **It sits> between two of them:** it is the strategy for the [product vision](../product-vision/product-vision_example.md)> agreed two weeks earlier, and it is the document under which the> [Saved Views PRD](../prd/prd_example.md) was written. The FY26 "Time to Insight" company goal that the PRD> and the `kpi-dashboard` example both cite appears below as the objective this strategy serves.>> All figures are illustrative. They are internally consistent with the other examples in this library and> are not drawn from a real company.
# Acme Analytics Product Strategy FY26
## Diagnosis
Acme can answer almost any question an unaccompanied analyst has, but only if they already know how to ask it. Everyself-serve path we have shipped begins at the schema: pick a dataset, pick a join, pick a measure. Our owntelemetry says that is where new users stop: **only 31 percent of new accounts build a second view within14 days**, and session recordings put the dropat the dataset picker rather than at sign-up or at sharing. Of the accounts that stall there, two thirdsnever return to authoring at all.
The consequence is that our growth depends on a resource we cannot ship: expertise. Accounts that succeedeither arrive with a data analyst or buy our services team's time. Both convert well and neither scales,which is why revenue per new account has been flat for five quarters while sign-ups have grown 40 percent.
**The obstacle is not acquisition, and it is not feature coverage. It is that the product requires knowledgethe user does not have, and we have been treating that as a documentation problem.**
## Target Segments, and Non-Targets
**Target: the unaccompanied analyst.** Someone at a 50-500 person company who owns a number, answersquestions about it weekly, and has no data team behind them. This strategy names them by what they lack;downstream delivery documents should call the same person the **Recurring Analyst**, by behaviour, and onename per person is the point. They are 61 percent of new accounts and 22 percent of revenue, and the gap between those two numbers is this strategy's whole subject.
**Non-target this period: enterprise data-platform teams.** They buy on governance, lineage and modellingdepth. We win some of these deals and they are profitable. They are still out of scope for FY26, becauseevery one of them pulls product and services capacity toward the expertise-heavy product we are trying tostop being. Sales leadership has agreed to hold the two enterprise RFPs currently open and not to sourcemore this year.
**Also non-target: the embedded-analytics OEM channel.** Two deals last year, both delivered by the servicesteam, both requiring a different product than the one above.
## Guiding Policy
**We will make the product usable without data expertise, rather than making expertise easier to acquire.**Where we face a choice between teaching the user what they need to know and removing the need to know it, weremove the need.
This rules out the approach we took for the last two years, and which is still the most popular internalproposal: better documentation, in-product tutorials, a certification programme, and a larger servicespractice. Those make expertise cheaper to acquire. They do not remove it from the path, and the drop-offhappens before anyone reads anything.
## Coherent Action
1. **Question-first entry.** The first interaction with a dashboard or a dataset is a question in the user's own words, not a schema. The system proposes the dataset and the joins; the user corrects rather than constructs.2. **Ship our modelling work as defaults.** The semantic modelling our services team currently does per account becomes shipped, per-vertical defaults, so a new account has useful views on day one instead of a blank canvas.3. **Instrument the second view.** The moment a user builds their second view is our leading indicator. Every team sees the same number, on the same dashboard, weekly.4. **Move services capacity from custom modelling to defaults.** The same people, the same skill, applied once per vertical instead of once per account.
All four serve the vision's claim that Acme belongs **inside the operational context where the questionoccurred** rather than being a destination people travel to. Question-first entry is that claim madeconcrete: the question arrives where the work is, not after a modelling step.
Actions 1 and 2 reinforce each other directly: question-first entry is only credible if there is a modelleddefault underneath it to answer against, and defaults are only discoverable if the user does not have toname them. Action 4 is what pays for action 2. Action 3 is what tells us whether the diagnosis was right,which is why it ships first.
## What We Are Not Doing
1. **We are not building a mobile authoring experience this year.** Mobile is 4 percent of authoring sessions and it competes for exactly the design capacity question-first entry needs. Consumption on mobile continues to work and is not being removed. *(Requested repeatedly by two of our largest accounts; both have been told.)*2. **We are not pursuing enterprise data-governance RFPs.** Winnable and profitable, and they pull us toward the product this strategy exists to move away from.3. **We are not shipping the certification programme.** It was funded in the FY25 plan and is the clearest example of making expertise cheaper rather than unnecessary. The team of two moves to defaults.4. **We are not adding new connectors this year** beyond the four already committed. Connector count is the metric our competitors compete on; it is not where our users stop.
## How We Will Know It Is Working
**Leading indicator:** share of new accounts that build a second view within 14 days. Baseline 31 percent(Q4 FY25), target **50 percent by the end of Q3 FY26**.
**Lagging:** self-serve net revenue retention, and the FY26 "Time to Insight" company goal, which the PRDstates as the median timefrom opening a report to **acting on it** and the KPI dashboard operationalises as a logged action. Thoseare deliberate narrowings of the same goal, not three different goals; this strategy is its product half.
**The falsifier, stated in advance:** if the second-view rate has not moved by the end of Q3, we treat thediagnosis as wrong rather than the execution as insufficient. The alternative diagnosis we would test next isthat the drop-off is about trust in the numbers, not about how they are constructed.
## Assumptions and Risks
| Assumption | Evidence we have | Evidence we lack | Test ||---|---|---|---|| Analysts stop at the schema because they lack context, not intent | 9 of 14 session recordings show a return to documentation before abandoning | We have not spoken to anyone who abandoned and never returned | 12 interviews with lapsed trials, by 20 March || A question-first entry point can be accurate enough to be trusted | Prototype resolved 71 percent of test questions to the right dataset | No production data; no measure of what happens after a wrong answer | Ship to 5 percent of new accounts in Q2, measure correction rate || Per-vertical defaults generalise | Services team reports 4 of 6 recent implementations were near-identical | The other 2 were not, and we do not know why | Build defaults for the 2 largest verticals first and measure fill rate || Holding enterprise does not break the number | Enterprise is 31 percent of revenue and under contract through FY26 | We do not know the renewal impact of two years of no governance investment | Reviewed at the Q3 renewal cycle, with the CRO |
**The assumption this strategy would die without is the first one.** If analysts abandon because they do nottrust the data rather than because they cannot construct the query, every action above is aimed at the wrongobstacle.
## Review Trigger
Reviewed when **any** of these happens, and on **15 October 2026** regardless:
- the second-view rate moves 8 points in either direction;- the lapsed-trial interviews contradict the first assumption;- a target-segment win rate drops in two consecutive quarters;- the services team reports that per-vertical defaults are not generalising.
**Owner: Dana Okoro, VP Product.** A competitor announcement is explicitly *not* a trigger. If we rewritethis document every time someone else ships something, we will have a series of reactions rather than astrategy.Provenance
Section titled “Provenance”The reasoning, the history and every source, in the repository:
- Companion - the long-form argument: why these sections, where the sources disagree, and what the bundle refuses to claim
- History - what changed in this bundle, and when
- Research log - every source consulted, with what each one actually supports
- Catalog metadata - the machine-readable record this page is generated from
Catalog record: 15 sections across 2 format(s), methodology methodology-agnostic; OKR-friendly, typically owned by Product Manager / CPO.